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Abstract. The existence of a phase transition with diverging susceptibility in
batch Minority Games (MGs) is the mark of informationally efficient regimes
and is linked to the specifics of the agents’ learning rules. Here we study how the
standard scenario is affected in a mixed population game in which agents with the
‘optimal’ learning rule (i.e. the one leading to efficiency) coexist with ones whose
adaptive dynamics is sub-optimal. Our generic finding is that any non-vanishing
intensive fraction of optimal agents guarantees the existence of an efficient phase.
Specifically, we calculate the dependence of the critical point on the fraction q of
‘optimal’ agents focusing our analysis on three cases: MGs with market impact
correction, grand-canonical MGs and MGs with heterogeneous comfort levels.
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1. Introduction
It is now well known that Minority Games (MGs) can display two types of phase
transitions separating ergodic phases from a non-ergodic regimes [1–3]. One type of
transition is characterized by a diverging susceptibility signalling the existence of an
informationally efficient phase with vanishing predictability of the bid time-series [4,5].
The second type of transition (referred to as memory-onset transition) occurs instead
at finite integrated response and is marked by a de Almeida-Thouless-instability and a
replica-symmetry broken phase at non-zero predictability, similar to phase transitions
observed in models of spin glasses [6, 7].
From a physical viewpoint, the divergence of static and dynamic susceptibilities signals
a sensitivity of the MG-dynamics to perturbations in the stationary state. A geometric
interpretation of this phenomenon has been devised in [8], and rests on the observation
that the microscopicN -dimensional state vector describing the system ofN interacting
agents evolves in an αN -dimensional space spanned by the quenched disorder of the
problem. Here α is the key control parameter of the model. The analysis of the MG
shows that the effective dimension of phase space is reduced to (1−φ)N as a fraction
φ ≡ φ(α) of agents ‘freezes’ during the course of the dynamics: frozen agents are those
who use just one of their strategies in the long run, so that their degrees of freedom
are effectively removed from the dynamics.
The breakdown of ergodicity is observed to occur at some α = αc satisfying the
condition [1− φ(αc)]N = αcN , i.e. it occurs when the dimensionality of the reduced
phase space becomes equal to that of the space in which the effective dynamics is
defined.
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The aim of the present paper is to test variations of the MG, in which the above
geometric picture is systematically modified, for the existence or otherwise of phase
transitions at diverging integrated response and for the presence of efficient phases
associated with this type of transition. Such alterations of the model occur naturally
when an additional degree of heterogeneity (besides the quenched randomness of the
strategies) is added to the agents’ learning rules, and appear to be a key ingredient of
more realistic models of the learning of agents. They are indeed very much in the spirit
of David Sherrington’s approach to Minority Games. David suggested the addition of
heterogeneity and complexity, and to study their effects on the phase behaviour of the
MG in numerous discussions as well as in earlier joint articles with the authors of the
present paper [9,10], and it is a pleasure to submit work along this line to the special
issue in honour of David’s 65th birthday.
Specifically, we will here consider MGs with agent-dependent impact correction, grand-
canonical MGs [11] with heterogeneous incentives to trade, and El-Farol type games
with heterogeneous comfort levels [12,13]. We demonstrate that in order to observe a
transition to an efficient phase, it is for a large class of MGs necessary, and in absence
of memory onset transitions also sufficient, that the above geometric interpretation
holds for a finite fraction of the agents. In turn, no efficient phase occurs when no
such group of agents exists.
2. Definitions and general remarks on the efficient-inefficient transition
Batch MGs [5] are discrete zero-temperature dynamical systems describing the coupled
time-evolution of N agents, labelled by i = 1, . . . , N in the following. Each agent, in
the simplest setup, is described by one continuous dynamical variable qi(t) which
evolves according to the following rules:
qi(t+ 1) = qi(t)− 2√
N
αN∑
µ=1
ξµi A
µ[q(t)] + hi(t),
Aµ[q(t)] =
1√
N
N∑
j=1
ωµj +
1√
N
N∑
j=1
ξµj sj(t), (1)
si(t) = sign[qi(t)].
α is here a finite positive control parameter while {ξµi , ωµi } are quenched random
variables, usually drawn independently from the set {−1, 0, 1} with weights
1/4, 1/2, 1/4, satisfying ωµi ξ
µ
i = 0. hi(t) is an external perturbation field, used to
measure the response of the system, and will be set to zero eventually. These equations
can be derived from a finance-inspired setup that has been discussed at length in
the literature (see e.g. [2]) and we shall not repeat it here in detail. In a nutshell,
agents’ choices are encoded in the Ising spins si(t), whose possible values represent
the two (heterogeneous) trading strategies of which every agent disposes. qi(t) is then
a ‘valuation’ by which agent i assesses the performance of his strategies, so that if
qi(t)→ ±∞ asymptotically, then agent i will stick to one of his strategies (si(t)→ ±1)
when t→∞. Otherwise, he will keep switching strategies forever. These two types of
agents are referred to as ‘frozen’ and ‘fickle’, respectively. Note that frozen agents are
insensitive to (small) perturbations of the dynamics in the steady state. µ denotes the
state of the world and may take on P = αN values. The quantity Aµ represents in
turn the bid imbalance (‘excess demand’) in state µ. Efficient states are characterized
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by zero bid imbalance (on average) and zero predictability. In an efficient phase no
statistical forecast of a bid imbalance is possible in any state µ. The predictability of
the system is measured by the quantity H = (αN)−1
∑
µ 〈A|µ〉2, with 〈·|µ〉 a time-
average conditioned on the occurrence of information pattern µ. The condition H = 0
implies 〈A|µ〉 = 0 for all µ = 1, . . . , αN , while H > 0 signals the presence of an
exploitable pocket of predictability in the time series of bid imbalances.
The dynamic update rules (1) demonstrate that, in absence of perturbations hi(t),
the state vector q(t) = (q1(t), . . . , qN (t)) moves in the space spanned by the αN N -
dimensional vectors ξ1 . . . , ξαN . A breakdown of the ability to remove dynamical
perturbations hence occurs when the space of possible perturbations assumes a higher
dimensionality than αN . Due to the freezing of φ(α)N agents, [1 − φ(α)]N linearly
independent modes of perturbations can be applied. The condition for ergodicity
hence reads 1− φ(α) < α so that ergodicity breaking occurs at a value of α such that
αc = 1− φ(αc).
The relation of this type of transition with the existence of a fully efficient phase, in
which H = 0, can be understood as follows: as discussed aboveH = 0 implies P = αN
conditions, one on each 〈A|µ〉. With (1 − φ)N effective degrees of freedom available
the system is able to evolve into an asymptotic stationary state H = 0 at most when
1−φ > α, i.e. in the phase where ergodicity is broken. Hence, the onset of a divergence
of the integrated response function occurs precisely at the phase boundary separating
a fully efficient (H = 0) non-ergodic phase from an inefficient (H > 0) ergodic one.
It is here worth noting that, although H is not a strict Lyapunov function of the MG
dynamics [1, 2], the pseudo-Hamiltonian H is effectively minimised in the stationary
states of the dynamics. This observation in fact allows for equilibrium approaches to
the MG, based on the replica method. We will not pursue these in the present paper,
however, but restrict to dynamical analyses using generating functional techniques [2].
The geometric picture of q moving in the space spanned by the ξµ’s is violated,
whenever the bid imbalance is agent-specific, i.e. when
qi(t+ 1) = qi(t)− 2√
N
P∑
µ=1
ξµi A
µ
i [q(t)], (2)
where Aµi now carries an explicit index i. This is the case in MGs in which agents
correct for their own impact on the global bid [14], in dilute MGs [15] and in El-Farol
games with heterogeneous comfort levels [12,13]. The update rule of grand-canonical
Minority Games (GCMGs) can also be captured by defining a suitable agent-specific
bid, as detailed below. Indeed the susceptibility remains finite and H > 0 for all α > 0
in such games.
One may here think of the following extreme cases: the standard MG, Aµi is fully
independent of i, i.e one has Aµi = A
µ for all i. The opposite case corresponds to full
heterogeneity, i.e. Aµi 6= Aµj with probability one for any i 6= j. The purpose of the
present paper is to study intermediate cases, i.e. MG-type games in which there is
some heterogeneity in the update rules, but where groups of extensive (O(N)) size use
the same bid imbalance to update their scores. To this end we will in the following
introduce a parameter 0 ≤ q ≤ 1, and study models in which the above geometric
picture hold for a group of qN agents (who all use the same bid-imbalance to update
their score valuations), but where the remaining (1−q)N agents display heterogeneity
in their learning rules. q therefore allows to interpolate smoothly between the MG
without additional heterogeneity (q = 1), and the case of fully heterogeneous agents
(q = 0).
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3. Minority Games with agent-specific impact correction
We will first address MGs with so-called impact correction [6, 7]. Here, agents take
into account the effects of their own trading actions. We will here not give details of
the interpretation as these have been discussed at length in the literature [1, 2], but
will start from
Aµi [q] =
1√
N
N∑
j=1
(
ωµj + sjξ
µ
j
)− ηi√
N
(ωµi + siξ
µ
i ) . (3)
We here assume that the {ηi} are drawn independently from a distribution R(ηi) at
the beginning of the game, and that R(·) is identical for all players.
Two well-developed techniques, adapted from spin glass physics and the theory of
disordered systems, are available to study MGs of the type discussed in this paper.
They rest on equilibrium and non-equilibrium approaches and are based on replica
theory and generating functionals respectively. Both approaches are discussed in
the recent textbooks [1, 2]. We will here not enter the mathematical details of the
derivation of the resulting effective macroscopic theories. The generating functional
analysis of MGs with heterogeneous impact correction factors leads to an ensemble of
effective stochastic processes
qη(t+ 1) = qη(t)− α
∑
t′
(1I +G)(t, t′)sη(t′) + αηsη(t) +
√
αζη(t), (4)
one for each value of η in the support of R(·). The relevant macroscopic order
parameters are the correlation and response functions, and are given by
C(t, t′) =
∫
dηR(η)Cη(t, t
′), G(t, t′) =
∫
dηR(η)Gη(t, t
′), (5)
where
Cη(t, t
′) = 〈〈sη(t)sη(t′)| η〉〉 , Gη(t, t′) = 1√
α
〈〈
δsη(t)
δζη(t′)
∣∣∣∣ η
〉〉
. (6)
Here 〈〈 ·| η〉〉 refers to an average over realisations of the effective process for a given
value of η only. The noise ζη has covariance
〈〈ζη(t)ζη(t′)| η〉〉 = [(1I +G)−1D(1I +GT )−1](t, t′) (7)
where D(t, t′) = 1+C(t, t′) for all t, t′, and 1I is the identity matrix. We here note that
the covariance of ζη does not depend on η, i.e. it is identical over the entire ensemble.
We still keep the subscript in ζη.
The analysis then proceeds by assuming a time-translation invariant state (Cη(t, t
′) =
Cη(t− t′), Gη(t, t′) = Gη(t− t′)) at finite integrated responses
χη =
∫
dτ Gη(τ) <∞. (8)
We will also write cη for the persistent part of the correlation function Cη(t− t′), and
proceed by taking the long-time average of the effective processes:
q˜η =
√
αζη − αsη
1 + χ
+ αηsη, (9)
with q˜η = limt→∞ qη(t)/t, and sη and ζη the asymptotic time-averages of sη(t) and
ζη(t). Further details of these steps can be found in [2, 5]. Note than χ appearing in
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the denominator on the RHS of (9) is χ and not χη. The static noise ζη has mean
zero and variance〈〈
ζ2η
∣∣ η〉〉 = 1 + c
(1 + χ)2
(10)
(independently of η), where
c =
∫
dη R(η) cη, χ =
∫
dη R(η) χη. (11)
Defining
v(η) =
√
α(1 − η(1 + χ))√
2(1 + c)
(12)
one then finds after separating frozen and fickle agents along the lines of [2, 5]
cη = 1 +
1− 2v(η)2
2v(η)2
erf[v(η)] − 1
v(η)
√
π
e−v(η)
2
(13)
for the persistent part of the correlation function Cη, and
χη =
1 + χ
α(1 − η(1 + χ)) erf[v(η)] (14)
for the integrated response of agents with impact correction factor η.
Equations (11)–(14) fully determine the persistent order parameters c and χ. We here
note that the predictability H can be shown to be given by
H =
1
2
1 + c
(1 + χ)2
, (15)
(see [1, 2] for details) so that a divergence of the integrated response χ signals the
onset of a fully efficient phase, characterised by H = 0, as discussed in the previous
section.
Since the error function is bounded, one may conclude from Eq. (14) that χη can
never diverge for any η 6= 0 at finite value of α. More precisely, let us write
R(η) = qδ(η) + (1 − q)P (η), (16)
where
∫
dηP (η) = 1, and where P (η) has no mass concentration (e.g. a δ-peak) at
η = 0, i.e. where we impose limδ→0
∫ δ
−δ dηP (η) = 0. Then using
χ
1 + χ
=
∫
dηR(η)
erf[v(η)]
α(1 − η(1 + χ)) (17)
we have
χ
1 + χ
= q
erf[v(0)]
α
+ (1− q)
∫
dηP (η)
erf[v(η)]
α(1 − η(1 + χ)) . (18)
If q = 0 then this reduces to
χ
1 + χ
=
∫
dηP (η)
erf[v(η)]
α(1 − η(1 + χ)) , (19)
and in the integral we always have η 6= 0 (since P (η) has no mass at zero). As a
consequence χ can never diverge, since the LHS of this equation approaches unity
when |χ| → ∞, whereas the RHS tends to zero (again note the boundedness of the
error function). We conclude that for q = 0 there can be no χ → ∞ transition, and
hence no efficient phase.
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Figure 1. (Colour on-line) Left: Phase diagram for R(η) = qδ(η) + (1 −
q)1I[−1,0](η). Right: H versus α for q = 0, 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1 (left to right).
Lines are from theory, symbols from simulations (αN2 = 1.6 · 105, 1000/√α
batch iterations, averages over 5 samples).
To illustrate these findings we show the phase diagram of the model in which each ηi is
drawn from a flat distribution P (η) = 1I[−1,0] over the interval [−1, 0] with probability
1 − q, and where ηi = 0 with probability q for each i (1I[a,b](x) = 1 for a ≤ x ≤ b and
zero otherwise). The left panel of Fig. 1 demonstrates that the integrated response
diverges at a finite value of α = αc(q) for any q > 0, resulting in an efficient phase
at α < αc(q). The location of the transition αc(q) tends to zero as q → 0, so that
the transition and efficient phase are absent for q = 0. In the right panel of Fig.
1 we depict the predictability H in dependence of α for different values of q, again
illustrating the fact that a transition between an inefficient and an efficient phase is
present for any q > 0, but that the phase with positive predictability persists for all
α > 0 in the case q = 0. We here note that simulations at small values of α are costly
in terms of CPU time and that numerical data at α smaller than approximately 0.02
may hence be prone to finite-size and equilibration effects. To conclude this section
we here note that we have explicitly excluded the case η > 0, as it is known that
a memory-onset (MO) transition here precedes the transition marked by a diverging
integrated response [6, 7]. The MO transition appears to persist when heterogeneous
distributions of the {ηi} are considered and if at least a finite fraction of impact
correction factors is positive, pre-empting the occurrence of an efficient phase.
4. Minority Games with heterogeneous comfort levels
We next consider MGs with heterogeneous comfort levels, sometimes also referred to
as El-Farol games or ‘clubbing’ games [12, 13]. In such games agents do not apply a
strict minority rule when updating their scores (the minority rule dictates that a good
move is to make a bid of the opposite sign of the total bid in the market), but apply
an individual comfort level λi. Thus the effective bid Ai agent i uses to update his
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strategy valuations is Ai(t) = A(t)− λi, and we have
qi(t+ 1) = qi(t)− 2√
N
∑
µ
ξµi

 1√
N
∑
j
{
ξµj sj(t) + ω
µ
j
}− λi

+ hi(t). (20)
Similar to the case of market impact correction we assume that the {λi} are drawn
independently from a distribution R(λi) at the beginning of the game.
The efficient phase here corresponds to a regime in which the population of agents
is able to co-ordinate their overall behaviour so that the mean total attendance 〈A〉
corresponds (on average) to the mean comfort level.
The generating functional analysis again results in an ensemble of effective agent
processes, one for each comfort level
qλ(t+ 1) = qλ(t)− α
∑
t′≤t
(1I +G)−1tt′ sλ(t
′) +
√
αηλ(t) + hλ(t). (21)
sλ(t) is given by sλ(t) = sgn[qλ(t)] and ηλ(t) is Gaussian noise of zero mean, and with
temporal correlations
〈〈ηλ(t)ηλ(t′)|λ〉〉 = [(1I +G)−1D(1I +GT )−1]tt′ + 2ftft′ − 2λ(ft + ft′) + 2λ2Ett′ .(22)
Here 1Itt′ = δtt′ is the identity matrix and Ett′ = 1 ∀t, t′, C and G are the correlation
and response functions of the system respectively , and we find an additional dynamical
order parameter G′:
Ctt′ = lim
N→∞
N−1
∑
i
〈〈si(t)si(t′)〉〉, Gtt′ = lim
N→∞
N−1
∑
i
∂〈〈si(t)〉〉
∂hi(t′)
,
G′tt′ = lim
N→∞
N−1
∑
i
λi
∂〈〈si(t)〉〉
∂hi(t′)
. (23)
The matrix D is, as before, given by Dtt′ = 1 + Ctt′ for all t, t
′ and we have
ft =
∑
t′
[(1I +G)−1G′)]tt′ . (24)
These order parameters are then to be determined as averages over realisations of the
effective processes and over the distribution of λ
Ctt′ =
∫
dλR(λ) 〈〈sλ(t)sλ(t′)|λ〉〉 (25)
Gtt′ =
∫
dλR(λ)
∂
∂hλ(t′)
〈〈sλ(t)|λ〉〉 (26)
G′tt′ =
∫
dλR(λ)λ
∂
∂hλ(t′)
〈〈sλ(t)|λ〉〉 (27)
(where 〈〈· · · |λ〉〉 is an average over realisations of the effective process restricted to
representative agents with comfort level λ).
Assuming time-translation invariance (i.e. Ctt′ = C(t − t′) and similarly for Gtt and
G′tt′) and finite integrated response one follows the standard ansatz to proceed from
the effective agent problem to explicit equations characterising the relevant persistent
order parameters of the ergodic stationary states. In our problem these are given
by c, the persistent part of the correlation function, and by χ =
∑
τ G(τ) and
χ′ =
∑
τ G
′(τ).
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The resulting 3× 3 system of non-linear equations for {c, χ, χ′} then reads
c =
∫
dλ R(λ) cλ, χ =
∫
dλ R(λ) χλ, χ
′ =
∫
dλ R(λ)λ χλ, (28)
with R(λ) the distribution from which the comfort levels {λi} are drawn and where
χλ and cλ given by
χλ =
(1 + χ)
α
erf (w(λ)) ,
cλ = 1 +
1− 2w(λ)2
2w(λ)2
erf (w(λ)) − 1
w(λ)
√
π
e−w(λ)
2
, (29)
where
w(λ) =
√
α
2g(λ)(1 + χ2)
(30)
with g(λ) is the persistent part of the temporal correlations of the noise ηλ(t) in the
effective agent problem:
g(λ) =
1 + c
(1 + χ)2
+ 2
χ′2
(1 + χ)2
− 4λ χ
′
1 + χ
+ 2λ2 . (31)
The mean attendance level comes out as
〈A〉 = χ
′
1 + χ
. (32)
We next perform an analysis similar to the one of the MGs with impact corrections,
and look for possible divergences of χ and χ′. One has
χ
1 + χ
= α−1
∫
dλR(λ)erf (w(λ)) (33)
and
χ′
1 + χ
= α−1
∫
dλR(λ)λerf (w(λ)) (34)
For χ→∞, we find from the former relation
1 = α−1 lim
χ→∞
∫
dλR(λ)erf (w(λ)) , (35)
i.e. not all w(λ) can go to zero as χ → ∞. If this happened for all λ for which R(λ)
has mass, then the RHS would go to zero.
Thus, in order for a transition at diverging integrated response to occur, the mass of
all λ for which limχ→∞ |g(λ)(1 + χ)2| <∞ must be positive. Now, we have
g(λ)(1 + χ)2 = 1 + c+ 2χ′2 − 4λχ′(1 + χ) + 2λ2(1 + χ)2. (36)
Assuming reasonably that χ′/χ → γ as χ → ∞, with γ finite, one finds that
g(λ)(1 + χ)2 remains finite, if and only if
γ2 + λ2 − 2λγ = 0 (37)
i.e. if λ = γ. In other words, if χ′/χ → γ as the susceptibilities diverge, then the
transition can only exist if R(λ) has positive mass concentration (delta-peak) at λ = γ.
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Figure 2. (Colour on-line) Left: Phase diagram for R(λ) = qδ(λ − 1/2) + (1 −
q)1I[0,1](λ). Right: Deviation of the mean overall bid 〈A〉 from the mean comfort
level Λ = 0.5 versus α for q = 0, 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1 (left to right). Lines are from
theory, symbols from simulations (αN2 = 1.6 · 105, 1000/√α batch iterations,
averages over at least 5 samples).
Let us take for example a symmetric distribution of λ around a value Λ. Then one
has R(Λ − ∆) = R(Λ + ∆). Now χ′ = Λχ is then a self-consistent solution at the
transition, because
χ′
χ
=
∫
dλR(λ)λerf
( √
α√
2g(λ)(1+χ)
)
∫
dλR(λ)erf
( √
α√
2g(λ)(1+χ)
) (38)
and g(Λ +∆) = g(Λ−∆) for diverging χ, χ′ and χ′/χ→ Λ.
Thus if one has a symmetric distribution of λ around a value Λ, then the χ → ∞
transition can exist only if R(λ) has a delta-peak at its mean Λ (plus other symmetric
contributions). This is confirmed in Fig. 2 where we depict the resulting phase
diagram for R(λ) = qδ(λ − 1/2) + (1 − q)1I[0,1](λ) at different values of q, and where
a phase in which the mean comfort level Λ = 0.5 is retrieved (| 〈A〉 −Λ| = 0) is found
for any q > 0, but where such a phase is absent at q = 0.
5. Grand-canonical Minority Game
Here we consider the case of grand-canonical MGs [11] with heterogeneous incentives.
In GCMGs agents hold only one active strategy, but have the option to abstain from
taking any action at any given time step. The batch upate rule for the scores of active
strategies can then be written in the form [16]
qi(t+ 1) = qi(t)− 1
N
∑
j
∑
µ
aµi a
µ
j nj(t)− αεi, (39)
where the {aµi } encode the active strategies of players, and where the {εi} are
incentives of agents not to trade. ni(t) is given by ni(t) = Θ[qi(t)]. One realises
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that the geometric interpretation of the score-vector moving in the space spanned by
the disorder holds when εi ≡ 0, and in this case a transition between an efficient and a
non-efficient regime is indeed observed [1,2,11]. The generating functional analysis for
the GCMG is detailed in [2, 16]. The representative process for agents with incentive
ǫ reads
qǫ(t+ 1) = qǫ(t)− α
∑
t′≤t
(1I +G)(t, t′)nǫ(t′)− αǫ+
√
αz(t), (40)
where nǫ(t) = Θ[qǫ(t)] and
〈z(t)z(t′)〉 = [(1I +G)−1C(1I +GT )−1](t, t′) (41)
C(t, t′) =
∫
dǫR(ǫ)Cǫ(t, t
′) =
∫
dǫR(ǫ) 〈nǫ(t)nǫ(t′)〉 (42)
G(t, t′) =
∫
dǫR(ǫ)Gǫ(t, t
′) =
1√
α
∫
dǫR(ǫ)
∂
∂z(t′)
〈nǫ(t)〉 (43)
〈·〉 here denotes an average over the static noise z. In the ergodic steady state, the
effective noise z(t) becomes a static random variable with variance
〈
z2
〉
= c/(1+χ)2,
with c =
∫
dǫR(ǫ)cǫ and χ =
∫
dǫR(ǫ)χǫ. Following [16] and introducing the shorthand
γ =
√
α/(1 + χ), the persistent autocorrelation and susceptibility at fixed ǫ are found
to be given by
cǫ =
〈
θ(z − γ − ǫ√α)〉+〈 (z − ǫ√α)2
γ2
θ(γ + ǫ
√
α− z)θ(z − ǫ√α)
〉
(44)
χǫ =
1
γ
√
α
〈
θ(γ + ǫ
√
α− z)θ(z − ǫ√α)〉 (45)
The above equations can be solved numerically, and in turn c and χ can be computed
for any distribution of incentives R(ǫ). As is customary, we divide the N agents in
two groups: Np producers with ǫ = −∞ (for whom c−∞ = 1 and χ−∞ = 0) and Ns
speculators with finite ǫ. We further fix np = Np/P = 1 and use ns = Ns/P as the
control parameter in place of α, which is now given by α = 1/(ns + np). For the
sake of simplicity, we work out the theory in detail only for the case where R(ǫ) is
symmetric around ǫ = 0, namely
R(ǫ) = qδ(ǫ) +
1− q
2
[δ(ǫ − ǫ¯) + δ(ǫ + ǫ¯)] (46)
with ǫ¯ a constant. The standard case corresponds to q = 1 and displays a transition
with diverging χ from an efficient (H = 0) to a non efficient (H > 0) regime when ns
decreases below the critical value n∗s ≃ 4.15.
In Fig. 3 we compare analytical predictions for different q and ǫ¯ = 0.25. As
expected, the phase diagram shows that the efficient phase shrinks as q increases
and, accordingly, the predictability vanishes.
Notice that the situation improves if an asymmetric distribution R(ǫ) is considered.
Indeed the dashed green line in Fig. 3 represents the boundary between the efficient
and the inefficient phase when R(ǫ) = qδ(ǫ) + (1 − q)δ(ǫ − 1), showing that even for
very small but non-zero q agents may wash out predictability from the time series of
bid imbalances. (Still, however, when q = 0 no efficient phase occurs.)
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Figure 3. (Colour on-line) Left panel: phase diagram of the grand-canonical
MG with heterogeneous incentives. The continuous line corresponds to the case
where R(ǫ) is as in (46), the dotted horizontal line marks the transition point n∗
s
of the original model. Right panel: H vs ns for q = 1, 0.8, 0.6, 0.4, 0.2 (left to
right). Markers correspond to simulations with fixed PNs = 32000, averages over
100 disorder samples.
6. Conclusions
To summarize, we have studied the phase structure of batch MGs with mixed
populations of optimally and sub-optimally learning agents, probing the robustness of
the efficient phase against modifications of the agents’ learning rules in the direction
of increasing heterogeneity. Regimes with zero predictability turn out to survive for
any finite fraction of optimal agents. It would be interesting to know whether altering
the information structure, that is taken to be fixed throughout the models discussed
here, can modify this picture. For instance, a single agent (or a finite group of agents)
with access to a more informative signal may alter this scenario or manage to take
advantage from it. This direction is to our knowledge unexplored so far, with the
possible exceptions of [17, 18] and some studies along these lines would be in our
opinion worthwhile.
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